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We present a simplified proof of Gbdel's theorem by appealing to well-known program-
ming concepts. The significance of Gbdel's result to computer science, mathematics
and logic is discussed.
1. Introduction
Most computer scientists have heard of Gbdel's Incompleteness Theorem, and many
have seen it "proved." Yet, Gbdel's theorem usually remains a mystery. The proof, as
it's generally presented, is almost incomprehensible. Students usually come away with
a feeling that they've somehow been tricked. They would probably ignore the theorem
altogether, but they've been told that it's very important, that it sets limits on Logic
and rational thought. It is therefore particularly unfortunate that both the theorem
and the proof are presented so mysteriously.
Part of the difficulty of the theorem is that it was written in the early 1930' s, before
the widespread use of general purpose computers. Gbdel's Theorem is a theorem about
computers —which was formulated before there were many computers. 3y using ideas
familiar to any programmer, Gbdel's Theorem can be made easily understandable.
There is no excuse for doing withput these concepts.
Section 2 presents an informal proof of Gbdel's theorem based on ideas from pro-
gramming. Section 3 generalizes the theorem to other questions of decidability, and
Section 4 relates the results to symbolic logic. Finally, Section 5 discusses some wider
implications of the theorem.
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2. The Halting Problem
Before proving Godel's theorem, I will prove an equivalent result due to Turing: The
Halting Problem, which asks, "For any given program and any given input, is there is a
way of determining whether that program will halt when given that input?" For many
programs this can be decided on a case by case basis. T.Vhat is wanted is a general pro-
cedure that, given any description of a program P, and any input x, will tell us whether
P halts when given x. In particular, we want a program that can decide the halting
question.
Before embarking on a search for a decision procedure for the halting problem, it is
wise to ask if such a procedure is possible. The classic approach tc determine whether
something is possible or not assumes its existence and shows that this assumption
leads to a contradiction. Self-contradictory things don't exist.
The proof I'll discuss is related to the famous Liar's Paradox of Epimenides:
This statement is a lie.
Is the above statement true or false? If we assume it's true, then we must conclude
that it's false (since it's a lie); if we assume it's false, then we must conclude it's true
(since it's not a lie). Put simply, this statement contradicts itself. Since this state-
ment can be neither true nor false, we must conclude that it makes no factual claim at
ail. It was considerations of paradoxes like this that led Gbdel and Turing to their
proofs.
In the statement of the theorem and its prcof we will use a Pascal-like programming
language called L. You will see, however that the result does not depend on the
language used, and remains true for any realistic programming language.
Definition: A procedure, called 'Halts', is called a decision procedure for the halting
problem in L if, given (l) any string p representing a program P in L, and (2) any
string x, YLa±ts(p,x) = true if P{x) halts, and Haltsfp.j:) = false if ?{x) gees into an
infinite loop.
Theorem: The decision procedure Halts for the halting problem in L is impossible.
Proof: Assume that the procedure Halts exists.
Haltsip.x) tells us whether the program P described by p will halt when applied to
the string x. Since o is itself a string, and we want to know what will happen when P is
applied to any string, we can legitimately ask what would happen if P were applied to
p, that is, if x-p. This is answered by the procedure call Halts(p,j>).








The meaning of "'definition of Halts" is that the definition of Halts is to be placed at
that position in the definition of 0; this permits Q to make use of Halts. The behavior
of Q is as follows: if P(p) halts, then Q goes into an infinite loop; otherwise Q immedi-
ately returns.
The character string above, which defines the procedure -}, Is a program in L. Call
this character string q:
q = procedure 0(p) . . . . end Q;'
Since q is a string representing a program in L, it is a legitimate input to the pro-
cedure Q. Therefore we can consider the behavior of Q{q). Let's trace the jteps. Q{q)
first asks if Halts(g,gr). Since Halts is a decision procedure for the halting problem, it
returns a Boolean (true or Taise) result indicating whether the procedure represented
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by g will halt when applied to g. But the procedure represented by g is Q itself, so
Halts(g.g) asks whether Q{q) halts.
Now, either Q(q) halts or it doesn't. If it halts, then Halts(g.g) returns trua, and
Q(q) goes into an infinite loop. This contradicts our assumption that Q{q) halts.
Therefore, let's suppose the opposite, that Q(q) doesn't halt. Then, Halts(g,?) returns
false and Q(q) immediately returns, i.e., halts. This again contradicts our assumption.
Since there are only two possibilities (Q(q) halts or it doesn't) and both lead to a con-
tradiction, we conclude that our assumption, that the procedure Halts is possible, was
contradictory. Therefore there can be no such procedure as Halts. OED.
We have skimmed over several issues in the proof of the halting theorem. In view of
its remarkable nature, we will reconsider them. In particular, a proof by contradiction
shows that at Least one of the assumptions is contradictory; it doesn't tell us which one.
In this case we made two major assumptions: that it is possible to write Halts in L and
that it is possible to write Q in L. Maybe Halts can be written but Q can't.
I haven't been too specific about what is and isn't legal in the language L. I have
said that L is typical in the sense that anything we prove about L ''/nil hold for any real-
istic language. In particular, observe that to be able to define Q, we only need to be
able to do the following things:
• Call another procedure (e.g. Halts).
• Do a conditional test.
• Go into an infinite loop.
• Return immediately (i.e., not go into an infinite loop).
These are things that can be done in any realistic programming language. Hence we
must conclude that there is no decision procedure for the halting problem for any real-
istic programming language.
Are there any other hidden assumptions in our proof? Yes, we have also assumed
that our language can handle arbitrarily long character strings. Since programs can
be arbitrarily long, this is necessary if we are to be able to write a Halts procedure
that's applicable to all programs. What about languages that don't have character
strings? The proof still goes through if there's any data type (say, integers) that is
equivalent to arbitrary bit strings. The reason is that a character string is just a string
of bits. It should be noted, however, that the proof does not go through if any resource,
either space or time, is limited to a particular amount. Since all real computers have
such limitations, the theorem only applies to idealized computers with unbounded
resources.
3. Other Decision Problems
Having found that there is no decision procedure for the halting problem, a natural
question to ask is: Vfhat other questions can't be decided by a program? The answer
is: almost any property you care to name. Suppose you want to write a decision pro-
cedure Does_D(p,x) that, for any behavior D, tells you if p does D when applied to x.








In the case of the Halting Problem D was 'halts', so don't do D was accomplished by
'label: goto label' and do Z?was accomplished by 'return'
Call this string q. 3y the same reasoning as before you can see that Q(q) does J if
and only if Q{q) doesn't do D. Hence we have a contradiction. The only way the proof
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can fail to go through is if the language is so weak that it is not possible to write code
that does D and doesn't do D. For any realistic programming language, and property D
of interest, it will be possible to write Q in the language.
There are some properties of programs that can be decided by programs. For
example suppose we wanted to write a function Halts_Quickly(p ,x ) which determines if
p halts within 100 years when applied to x . Intuitively it seems like we ought to be able
to write such a function: we just run P{x) until it halts or until 100 years are up, which-
ever occurs first. Thus, Halts_Quickly(jo,r) always returns an answer, although we may
have to wait 100 years to get it!
But, can't we write a paradoxical procedure Q that runs less than 100 years only if it
doesn't run less than 100 years? Let's try and do this. If HaltsJ3uickly(p ,p) is true, we
will go into an infinite loop (looping for over 100 years would be adequate); otherwise we
will return immediately. The resulting program is:
procedure Q(p) is
... definition of Halts_Quickly ...
begin
if Halts_Quickly(p,p) then Loop forever
else return;
end Q;
New consider the application Q(q). Does it halt quickly or not?
Suppose Q{q) halts within 100 years; then, Halts_Quickly(g,g) returns Lma, and
Q{q) loops forever. This contradicts our assumption that Q(q) halts quickly.
Now suppose Q{q) does not halt within 108 years; then Halts_Quickly(g,g) is false,
and Q{q) returns immediately. Does this lead to a contradiction? No, since the run-
ning time of Q{q) includes the time necessary to execute Haits_Quickly(g,g). This
could well be more than 100 years (as it would be if we implemented it in the naive way
described previously). Hence there is no contradiction.
This does not mean we can write Halts-Quickly, only that it does not lead to a con-
tradiction in the same way as Halts. On the other hand, our informal implementation
discussion shows that Halts_Quickly could actually be programmed.
Thus, the halting theorem does not say that it is impossible for a program to decide
any property of all programs. In fact it is the unlimited properties (e.g., halts eventu-
ally) which are undecidable; limited properties (e.g., halts within 100 years) are often
decidable.
4. Symbolic Logic
You have probably heard that Gbdel's theorem has something to do with the limitations
of logic; you may have even heard that it sets bounds on rational thought. Yet, I have
not said anything about logic in the preceding sections. 1 have only discussed the limi-
tations of what programs can tell us about other programs. To understand the connec-
tion between programs and logic, it will be necessary to discuss some topics in the
foundations of mathematics.
A major concern of mathematicians in the 19th century was rigor, standards of
proof by which mathematicians could ensure that their theorems were true. Mathema-
ticians were anxious to secure the foundations of mathematics, to ensure that there
were no contradictions implicit in mathematical theories. Mathematicians divided
themselves into several, often antagonistic, schools depending on the approach to foun-
dations that they took. One of the mcst important of these schools, founded by the
famous mathematician FJ avid Hilbert (1862-1946), was called formalism.
It had long been observed that deductive reasoning was often formal; that is, the
correctness of a deduction could be decided on the basis of the form of the argument
without reference to the meanings of the terms used in it. This is particularly true cf
mathematical proofs: they are often accomplished by successively transforming a for-
mula into new formulas. These transformations are simple mechanical rearrange-




x + l = 5 => (x + l)-l = (4+l)-l
=* ar+(l-l) = 4+(l-l)
=> x+Q = 4+0
=> x-4
The formalists believed that ail mathematics could be reduced to formal systems. A
formal system has two parts: (l) a set of initial strings, and (2) a finite set of comput-
able transformation rules. By applying the transformation rules to the initial strings,
a formal system generates a set of derived strings. As you can see, a formal system is
a primitive sort of program, in which (i) the transformation rules are the operations
and statements of the program, (2) the initial strings are the input data, and (3) the
derived strings are the intermediate and output data that result from applying the pro-
gram to the input data.
The formalists believed that they could make mathematics rigorous by reducing it
to a formal system. By letting the initial strings of a formal system represent the
mathematical axioms, and the transformation rules represent the deductive rules of
inference, the derived strings would represent just those theorems that could be
deduced from the axioms. Since the transformation rules were mechanical symbol
manipulation operations, independent of the meaning of the symbols, it seemed that
this approach would eliminate both non-rigorous ideas and the use of intuition from
mathematical proofs.
Another important goal of the formalist program was to establish the consistency of
mathematics. Consistency means that it is not possible to prove both a proposition 'P'
and its negation 'not P\ In other words, consistency means that there are no contrad-
ictions inherent in the axioms.
• The set of initial strings is required to be recursive, i.e., a computer program, can decide -vhether a given
string is an initial string or not.
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Mathematicians are also concerned with the completeness of their axioms: how
many axioms must be included in order to prove all true theorems? In other words, if
a theorem is true, and can be expressed in the symbols of the formal system, it should
be possible to derive it from the initial strings (axioms) by using the transformation
rules (rules of inference).
Formal systems gave the formalists hope that they would be able to prove the con-
sistency and completeness of some formalization of mathematics. This is because for-
mal systems are themselves mathematical objects. Therefore, it is possible to prove
things about formal systems by using mathematical techniques. In particular, they
wished to show the consistency and completeness of mathematics by using rules of
inference that were so simple that no one could object to them. They wanted to use
ftTvitistic rules, that is, rules that could be executed on a computer.
You may have already realized the dubiousness of this proposition. A formal system
is essentially a programming language, and we know that it's impossible for a program
to decide much of anything about a reasonably powerful programming language.
Hence, if we conceive of mathematics as a formal system (i.e., programming language),
then we can see that it will be impossible for mathematics to decide (prove) much of
interest about any reasonably powerful formal system, including itself. Hence, it's not
likely to be possible to use mathematics to prove the consistency and completeness of
mathematics. This is j n fact the case.
Let's consider how we could prove tins result more carefully. Suppose the LormaJ
mathematical language is powerful enough to express the theorem 'p halts on a:', for
any program p (in some programming language) and for any input x. Then we know
that this formal mathematical system must be incomplete, because otherwise we could
either prove or disprove 'p halts on x' for each program p and input x. This would
solve the halting problem, which we just showed is impossible. Hence, the central issue
is whether our formal mathematical language is powerful enough to state the theorem
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'p halts onx'.
Next I argue that the theorem 'p halts onx' can be stated in any reasonably power-
ful formal mathematical language. In particular, if we can talk about integers,
sequences and sets of integers, and the arithmetic operations, then we can express 'p
halts onz'.
First, since 'p halts on x' is a proposition about programs, it must be possible to
talk about programs mathematically. A program in any programming language can
always be written as a finite sequence of characters, and characters can be thought of
as small integers (say, integers in the range to 255 in the ASCII code), so any pro-
gram can be represented by a finite sequence of integers, which is a mathematical
object. If we assume that our programs take strings as inputs and return strings as
outputs, then the inputs and outputs of programs can also be represented as
sequences of integers.
We now know how to represent the program p and the input x\ how do we express 'p
halts otur 1 ? Teat this means is that if p is applied to x , then some output y will result.
Now, if T,ve had a function 'apply (p,x)' that returned the result of applying p toi
(assuming it halts) then we could express 'p halts onx' mathematically:
p halts on x if and only if there exists a y such that y = apply(p ,x)
Notice that 'apply' is just a mathematical function that takes two sequences of integers
and returns a sequence of integers.
The 'apply' function is essentially an interpreter for our programming language.
Can one define an interpreter using just mathematics? LISP programmers will realize
that the answer is "yes," because programming in pure LISP is essentially program-
ming in mathematics, and a LISP interpreter can be written in about twenty-five lines
of LISP. If you are not familiar with LISP you may take a little more convincing.
Think about the way a program executes: at each stage of its execution it takes the
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values of a number of variables and computes new values for a (possibly overlapping)
set of variables. This alteration in the variables is determined by the current instruc-
tion being executed in the program. Further, each instruction designates another
instruction as the next one to execute.
Now, the memory that contains all the variables in a program is just an array of bits,
so the memory can be represented as a sequence of integers. Also, the instrue tion-
pointer, which designates the next instruction in the program to execute, is just a
sequence of bits, so it can also be made part of this sequence of integers. Notice that
this sequence of integers, which we call the state of the program, is all that changes
from one step of the program to the next.
In order to avoid a lot of very tedious details, 1 have to skip some of the finer points
of this argument. Therefore, suppose that we have defined a mathematical function
'Next_State' such Next_State(p,s) is the state resulting from executing one step of the
program p in state s. (The instruction to execute is determined by the instruction-
pointer part of s
.) It should be fairly clear that it is possible to define such a function,
because most programming language instructions just change a few variables, i.e.,
replace a few elements of the sequence of integers representing the state. Control-flow
instructions (e.g., goto) just change the part of the state representing the instruction-
pointer.
Assuming we have the Next_State function, it is easy to complete the argument. To
do this we need to define the idea that, given states s and s', executing the program in
state s will eventually lead to a state s'. This just means that it is possible to get from
s to s' by executing zero or more steps in the program, i.e., we can get from s to s' by
zero or more applications of Next-State. This is easy to express mathematically as a
recursive definition:
Program p eventually takes 3 to s' if and only if
either s=s'
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or there is a state s" such that
s" = Next_State(p,s) and program p eventually takes s' to s'
It is now simple to express the equation y = appiyip ,x):
y - apply(p ,x) if and only if program p eventually takes x' toy
where x' is x with the initial instruction-pointer appended in the proper place.
This completes the argument that the halting problem can be expressed in a reason-
ably powerful formal mathematical system. Thus, a reasonably powerful formal
mathematical system, if it's consistent, must also be incomplete.
5. Relevance
Gbdel's Incompleteness Theorem is often misinterpreted. In popular accounts it is
often represented as a proof of the inherent limitations of logic and mathematics. In
some quarters it is used as an excuse for irrationality and mysticism. Thus it is impor-
tant to consider the relevance of Gbdel's theorem, in particular to logic and mathemat-
ics.
Gbdel's theorem has great relevance to computer science. In its form as the Halting
Problem and its extensions, it tells us that we should not try to find algorithms that can
infallibly decide certain questions about any given program. Thus, Gbdel's theorem
puts ultimate limits on the capabilities of computers.
Yftiat is the relevance of Gbdel's theorem to logic and mathematics? It's major
effect has been to destroy the formalist program in mathematics. A primary goal of
that program was to prove, using mathematics, the consistency and completeness of
mathematics; Gbdel showed that this cannot be done. Gbdel also showed that many
ether formal logical systems, such as three-valued logic, also suffer from the incom-
pleteness property. This should not surprise us, since any reasonably powerful formal
system is equivalent to a programming language, and so suffers from the undecidabil-
ity theorems.
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Does this then indicate an inherent and unavoidable limitation to logic and
mathematics? Only if you are a formalist. In essence, Gbdel's theorem says that for-
malism cannot capture all of the power of mathematics and logic.
Let's consider an example of the latter case. Consider Fermat's Last Theorem, which
states that there are no integers x, y, and z such that for some n>2, xn+yn =zn . This
theorem has been neither proved nor disproved, although there is ample empirical evi-
dence of its truth. Suppose that Fermat's Last Theorem were known to be undecidable
in some reasonably powerful formal mathematical system. We would then have to con-
clude that the theorem is true. How can this be? Suppose (contrary to fact) that it
were false. Then there would exist integers a, b, c, and fc>2 such that akjrb k -c k .
Now, in all reasonably powerful formal mathematical systems the following is a valid
deduction:
1. Jfc>2
2. ak +b k =c k
3. Therefore, there exists x, y , z , and n>2 such that xn +yn =zn
The latter proposition is the contradictory of Fermat's Last Theorem. Hence, if
Fermat's Last Theorem is false, then it will be decidable in any reasonably powerful for-
mal mathematical system. Conversely, if Fermat's Last Theorem is undecidable in any
reasonably powerful formal mathematical system, then the theorem must be true.
QED.
What have we done here? It seems that we've taken an undecidable theorem and
decided it. More precisely, we've proved a theorem that was not provable within the
system. Sometimes this land of proof is called "meta-mathematical" or "meta-
Logical," but these are misnomers. The prefix 'meta-', suggests that some sort of
unusual process has been used. In fact we've just used the plain, old, garden-variety,
Aristotelian logic that's been known for 2500 years. Cur proof would be clear to Euclid.
-13-
Thus, there is nothing superior or esoteric about our meta-logical proof. It -.vould be
more accurate to call the deductions of a formal logical system sub-Logical proofs.
The conclusion we should draw is that formal systems are not very gocd models for
either mathematics or logic. Formal systems model situations where propositions can
be deduced from other propositions without regard for the meanings of the terms in
those propositions. One of the premises of formalism is that all mathematical truths
can be derived by applying this formal deductive process to a fixed set of axioms (ini-
tial strings). This has never been the case in mathematics. On the contrary, although
there is little debate on the laws of algebra or the calculus, there is an interminable
debate on the choice of the axioms upon which to found mathematics.
The problem is that since the time of Euclid mathematics has been viewed as a
purely deductive science in which theorems are deduced from given axioms and
definitions. In Euclid's time these axioms and definitions were considered self-evident;
the formalists considered them arbitrary. Thus, the axioms and definitions are con-
sidered the foundation of the edifice of mathematics.
In this deductive view mathematics is very different from the inductive sciences like
physics and chemistry. In these the basic laws are neither self-evident nor arbitrary.
Rather, they are the result of a lengthy process of scientific investigation. They are not
the foundations of these sciences; they are the capstones.
In fact mathematics is more like the other sciences than is generally acknowledged.
For eons man has known that apples drop from trees; it took Newton to explain this in
terms of the more basic ideas of mass and gravity. Similarly, for eons man has known
that 2+2=4; mathematicians are still proposing explanations of this fact in terms of
more basic ideas. Mathematics, like the other sciences, proceeds by a combination of
induction and deduction.
In summary, Gbdel's Incompleteness Theorem is net a theorem about logic cr
mathematics; it is a theorem about programming. It places limits on the capabilities
of computers, not on the capabilities of mathematics or logic. Contrary to the com-
mon notion that it demonstrates the impotence of reason, it is actually a sterling
example of the power of reason.
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